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THE ONGOING REVOLUTION IN PUNISHMENT 
THEORY: Doing Justice as Controlling 
Crimet 
Paul H. Robinson * 
You probably remember from your first-year criminal law class the age­
old tension between the retributivists who want to punish offenders because 
they deserve it, they see deserved punishment as a value in itself, and the 
utilitarians (or instrumentalists), who believe that punishment must have 
some more practical justification, such as avoiding future crime, perhaps 
through deterrence, incapacitation of the dangerous, or rehabilitation. The 
dispute between these two groups is classically thought to be irresolvable. 
The two are simply using different currencies and think different things to 
be important. 
One of the most exciting developments in current punishment theory 
suggests that these two positions may not be entirely irresolvable, at least in 
a sense. You all know the American Law Institute and the Model Penal 
Code that it promulgated in 1962. Almost three-quarters of the states have 
since codified their criminal law in ways modeled after that code. Last year, 
for the first time in forty-six years, the Model Penal Code was amended to 
change the section setting out the purposes of the code, its provisions, and 
how those provisions are to be interpreted. And much of what I will talk 
about today is the story, in intellectual terms, of how that change in 
perspective came about. 
I'll come back to the Model Penal Code amendment at the end of the 
talk. Let me start with some background leading up to those recent events. 
The most fundamental question for criminal law may be this: How can 
we justify having a system that imposes punishment? The moral 
philosophers have killed many forests answering this question but, to be 
honest, I've always found it a bit boring. It seems to be a purely academic 
debate. Every alternative purpose on the list of possibilities argues for the 
same conclusion: Yes, we should have a criminal justice system that 
imposes punishment. Such a system would be useful because it provides the 
t This is the text of the First Annual Edward J. Shoen Lecture, delivered at the Sandra 
Day O'Connor College of Law, Arizona State University, on February 26.2009. The lecture is 
drawn from PAUL H. ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW: WHO SHOULD BE 
PUNISHED How MUCH? (2008). 
* Colin S. Diver Professor of Law, Cniversity of Pennsylvania. 
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opportunity to impose deserved punishment, to deter future offenses, to take 
control of dangerous persons, to rehabilitate offenders that need it, and so 
forth. It is no surprise that every known organized society has had some 
kind of system of criminal justice that imposes punishment on wrongdoers. 
The more difficult, but much more interesting question, is this: If we are 
to have a criminal justice system, who is to be punished by that system, and 
how much? This is not an academic question; it is in fact the core of what 
criminal law and theory is about. It is a question of enormous practical 
significance. What kind of instructions should a legislature give to a 
criminal code revision commission? What kind of instructions should be 
given to a developer of sentencing guidelines such as the United States 
Sentencing Commission, created by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984? 
What sort of interpretive rules should a criminal code give to judges in 
applying that code? What sort of rules should sentencing judges use in 
exercising their discretion? 
Unless we are to allow every individual commissioner and every judge 
to just make things up as they go along, which would be obviously and 
seriously problematic, we must provide some sort of guidance. If a 
commissioner or judge must decide whether to adopt any given formulation 
of a rule, or to adopt any particular interpretation, or to impose a particular 
sentence that advances one purpose at the expense of another, what kind of 
rational guidance can they be given in making that selection?] 
These are particularly challenging questions. Because of the alternative 
distributive principles that one might adopt to decide these issues, different 
principles will distribute liability and punishment in different ways than will 
any other.2 Thus, the central question in criminal law theory, the question I 
want to talk about today, is: Which of the alternative principles (or which 
combination of principles) for distributing criminal liability and punishment 
should we rely upon? 
First, for terminological purposes, let me list what I mean by each of the 
alternative principles that I will mention. 
1. For a more detailed discussion, see ROBINSON, supra note t, at ell. I. 
2. For a more detailed discussion, see id at ch. 2. 
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Each of these alternative distributive principles looks to a different 
criterion and therefore would distribute different amounts of liability and 
punishment to different people in different situations. Consider, for 
example, the case of the elderly man who was once a Nazi torturer. If one is 
focusing purely on deserved punishment, this would be an easy case for 
imposing liability because what the person has done is so horrible. 
Similarly, if your focus is general deterrence, using this case as an 
opportunity to dissuade others by the threat of liability and punishment for 
engaging in such conduct in the future, then again, there is good reason to 
punish. On the other hand, if one's focus is incapacitation or rehabilitation, 
punishment in such a case may be a complete waste of resources. The 
offender may no longer be a danger. Or, if the focus is special deterrence, 
imposing punishment in order to deter future offenses by the offender at 
hand, punishment again may be a waste of resources; this offender is not 
likely to ever again have the opportunity to engage in such horrors. 
Consider too the question of whether the criminal law ought to recognize 
an excuse defense for people who are seriously mentally in and have, 
because of that illness, committed an offense without realizing its 
wrongfulness. If the focus is desert, there is no blameworthiness and 
therefore no reason to punish. Similarly, if the focus is special deterrence, 
such people may well be sufficiently dysfunctional that they simply do not 
understand, or cannot respond in a rational way to, the deterrent threat. On 
the other hand, there may be very good reasons to deny an excuse defense 
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and impose liability on the seriously mentally ill offender if one's 
distributive principle is incapacitation or rehabilitation. The person has 
already demonstrated that their mental illness makes them dangerous. 
Finally, if the distributive principle were general deterrence, liability in such 
cases could be an effective way of signaling all non-insane potential 
offenders that the criminal law is quite serious about punishing this kind of 
conduct, and that they ought not hold out some hope that they can commit 
the offense but find some insanity loophole. Indeed, denying an insanity 
defense can present a useful opportunity to reinforce the seriousness of the 
deterrent threat. 
Notice, most interestingly, that not only do different distributive 
principles answer the insanity defense question differently, but that the 
alignment of principles on each side of the question is different for the issue 
of the insanity defense than it is for the previous issue of what to do with 
the elderly Nazi torturer. Other questions will similarly generate altogether 
different alignments. 
Consider, for example, the question before a criminal code commission 
that must decide whether to have attempts punished the same as the 
completed offense or to have attempts punished less. A distributive 
principle of incapacitation or rehabilitation would suggest that they be 
punished the same, at least in the common case in which the attempter and 
the successful offender are equally dangerous. Yet general and special 
deterrence, and at least some forms of desert, would suggest that the 
attempter be punished less. 
In other words, the distributive principle we adopt for the criminal justice 
system really does make a difference. We must make some choices. My 
plan for the next forty minutes is to work through each one of the 
alternative distributive principles and to evaluate the strengths and 
weaknesses of each in the hope that, at the end of the process, we can step 
back, evaluate the alternatives, and make some judgment about which 
principle might seem most attractive (or at least decide which is the least 
unattractive). 
To give a hint at where we are headed, it turns out that none of the 
alternative distributive principles are perfect. All have flaws. It will be a 
complicated decision at the end to pick one or to try to construct some kind 
of hybrid principle that combines two or more. That task will require us to 
have a somewhat nuanced appreciation for the relative strengths and 
weaknesses of the different distributive principles, so let us consider each in 
turn. 
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1. DETERRENCE 
The most obvious strength of general deterrence is its enormous potential 
efficiency. By punishing a few people, there is the potential for influencing 
the conduct of thousands or hundreds of thousands of other potential 
offenders. 3 
On the other hand, however, there can be no deterrent effect unless 
certain basic prerequisites are satisfied. First, the target must know the rule 
by which we seek to influence the person's conduct. Second, the target must 
be able and willing to calculate the costs and benefits for their own self­
interest; that is, they must be able and willing to take the threat contained in 
the deterrence-based rule and use it to decide how they will act. Third, 
having done those calculations, the target must come to the conclusion that 
the costs of the contemplated offense, in terms of punishment, outweigh the 
benefits of the offense. Yet, as I'll discuss, these prerequisites commonly do 
not exist. Situations in which they all exist, a necessary prerequisite for any 
deterrent effect, are the exception rather than the rule. 
Let's look at each of the three prerequisites in turn, to see the real world 
complications that arise in trying to satisfy each. As to the first prerequisite, 
that the target must know the rule by which we seek to manipUlate his 
conduct, the studies suggest that offenders commonly don't know the rule. 
How many people here know what the Arizona rule is on felony murder? 
On "three strikes"? Not many, and most the people here are legally trained. 
What are the chances that a young man standing outside of a convenience 
store contemplating a robbery will know the rule? Yet it is this person 
whose conduct the rule seeks to influence. 
One thing that helps us in this instance is that the more involved a person 
is in the business of criminality, the greater their incentive to actually learn 
the criminal law's rules. But, what we know from studies is that even 
criminals commonly have no idea what the rule is, and, even if they think 
they know, they often have it wrong. 
Even if the target knows the rule, there can be no deterrent effect unless 
the person is able to take that information and use it to rationally guide their 
conduct. The problem here is that the people most likely to be offenders are 
the people who are most likely to be bad calculators, or be indifferent to 
future consequences. They are more likely to be under the influence of 
alcohol, drugs, anger, fear, group arousal, group identity shift, over­
impulsiveness, mental illness, or a variety of other factors making them 
dysfunctional in their calculations. This is not true of every offender, of 
3. For a more detailed discussion, see id at chs. 3-4. 
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course. White collar offenders, for example, are much more likely to be the 
rational calculators that deterrence requires. 
Even if the target knows the rule and is a rational calculator, however, 
there can be no deterrent effect unless the target perceives that the costs of 
the contemplated offense outweigh its benefits. As Bentham has famously 
suggested, this perception is the product of three things: the probability of 
punishment, its intensity (its amount), and its timing (the delay of the 
punishment following the offense). Let's look at each of these components 
of the deterrence formula in turn. 
The effect of probability-of-punishment on deterrent value gives us some 
reason to be concerned. While we can't make too much of animal studies, 
I'll cite a few different ones during my talk today, they can be useful in at 
least giving a hint at where potential problems may be because many 
species share the physiological reactions of humans. So, for example, 
studies of rats suggest that deterrent effect drops off fairly quickly as the 
punishment rate decreases. Where most offenses have a punishment rate of 
100 or 50 to 1, it should not be complete surprise that this threat level 
proves inadequate to deter. 
We are helped here by the fact that people tend to exaggerate the 
likelihood of rare events. That's why people buy lottery tickets. However, 
the more a person is inclined toward criminality, the more they may have a 
special incentive to sort out what the real rate of punishmen t  is and thus 
may discover that is quite low. 
That people tend to exaggerate their own abilities also hurts deterrence. 
That is, an offender may hear that another burglar has been caught and 
punished but may discount the significance of this to him on grounds that he 
is a much better burglar than the other person. The unfortunate bottom line 
is found in studies like that by Anderson, who suggests that many if not 
most offenders think the threat of punishment sufficiently low as to be of 
limited importance to them. 
Regarding the amount-of-punishment part of the equation, it seems clear 
that we can, of course, impose punitive bite. What is less clear is whether 
we can modulate the amount of punishment, as a deterrence-based system 
would require. There are a host of facts that make it difficult to predict and 
control the amount of punishment that will be felt and remembe red. 
One well-known complication is found in the human tendency toward 
discounting future benefits and costs. Thus, most people would prefer to 
take $100 in hand right now rather than anabsolute guarantee of $150 a year 
from now, even though they can't eam 50 percent annual interest. 
Another complication comes from what one might call "learning the 
pain." Having trained rats to get food by pressing a bar, one can deter them 
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from continuing to press the bar by applying an 80 volt shock. However, the 
application of a 60 volt shock is not likely to deter. The animal will simply 
take the pain to gain the food. If one gives a 60 volt shock (which the 
animal will accept), then a 70 volt shock (which the animal will also 
accept), then the 80 volt shock, the animal will not be deterred, because the 
two lower-intensity shocks have taken away the value of the higher 
punishment. The animal learns that he can indeed take the 60 volts and the 
70 volts; thus the 80 volts no longer holds the intimidation value it had 
when applied as the starting point. Indeed, when increasing incrementally, 
the animal takes up to 300 volts before being deterred! The point here is 
that the dynamic of deterrence can be a complex one. 
Another source of complexity is ShO\\,l1 by subjective well-being studies. 
Whether a person wins the lottery or becomes a paraplegic in a car accident, 
it is not uncommon for the person to adjust their baseline perspective over 
time. The lottery winner is ecstatic for awhile but may return to their old 
cranky, unhappy self as their expectations adjust upwards. The same can 
happen in reverse for paraplegics. This is not good news for a deterrence 
regime, for it means that the bite of imprisonment is likely to dissipate over 
time, making each successive unit of imprisonment less painful even though 
the cost of each unit remains the same. This produces an increasing 
inefficiency as the permitted prison term gets longer. The bar graphs below 
illustrate the point. While policy makers tend to think in tenns of the "naive 
calculation" in Bar 1, the reality is closer to the "adaptation calculation" in 
Bar 2. 
• 
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In fact, human nature makes things even worse for deterrence. "Duration 
neglect" studies suggest that it is both the maximum intensity and the 
endpoint intensity that determine the remembered punitive bite, but that the 
duration of punishment is of relatively negligible effect. This is particularly 
significant when combined with the point just noted: that the punitive bite 
of imprisonment naturally degrades over time. The longer the term of 
imprisonment, the lower the perceived endpoint intensity. Thus, at least 
theoretically, longer terms of imprisonment such as in Bar 2 below may be 
remembered as having less total punitive bite than the shorter term of 
imprisonment in Bar 3, because the important endpoint intensity dissipates 
over time in Bar 1. 
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Regarding the last component of the deterrence formula, the delay in 
punishment, consider another animal study. Hungry dogs are given separate 
bowls containing good tasting food and bad tasting food. At a session after 
they have sorted out which is the good tasting food, they are allowed back 
into test room and immediately go for the good tasting food but then are 
bonked on the nose with a newspaper by the experimenter (bonking being 
an experience that dogs do not like). Some dogs are bonked immediately, 
some after a 5-second delay, and some after a I5-second delay. When the 
dog is later allowed back into the room, we can see how the different delay 
periods affect the length of time it takes them to return to the good tasting 
food. The dogs bonked after I5-second delay take three minutes to try 
eating the good tasting food again. In contrast, those dogs bonked more 
quickly, after only a 5-second delay, take eight days before they risk eating 
the good tasting food again! Those bonked immediately take two weeks 
before they try again. Clearly, the timing of punishment can be highly 
influential on deterrent effect. 
Given that in the criminal justice system punishment is almost always 
long delayed, on average seven months after a guilty plea and thirteen 
months after trial and conviction, one may worry that the delay can 
seriously undermine the deterrent effect. Again, the point here is simply that 
deterrence is a complex business with complex dynamics, and there are 
many ways in which deterrent effect can be lost. 
Compare these difficulties in establishing the costs of crime, low 
probability and long delay, with the perceived benefits of a crime, which are 
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likely to be perceived as having a high probability (because of the low 
capture rate) and an immediate tangible benefit. 
This skepticism about the satisfaction of the three prerequisites for 
deterrence is compounded by additional independent concerns about 
complexity in the application of a deterrence program. The problem of 
substitution effects, for example, is well known. Even if a deterrence 
program is successful, it might simply drive offenders to commit more 
serious offenses, as Katyal has noted. Adding to the problem are dynamic 
effects. By being successful in creating a deterrent effect, one is likely to 
necessarily alter the parameters of the deterrence equation for the future, as 
Bar-Gill and Harel have suggested. 4 
Ultimately, the difficulties of deterrence are shown in the aggregated­
effect studies, which use real-world experiments, such as gauging crime 
rates before and after a rule or policy change, to determine whether the rule 
or policy has had the desired deterrent effect. The studies are useful because 
even if it seems that the prerequisites for effective deterrence are not 
present, it might be that there nonetheless may be a deterrent effect that 
somehow operates in ways that social scientists do not yet understand. 
But the studies suggest just the opposite. That is, they seem to bear out 
the conclusion that effective deterrence is possible only if the prerequisites 
are satisfied, but that the prerequisites commonly are not satisfied. The 
studies show that even when reformers actively seek to increase deterrence, 
there is most commonly no effect, and where there is any effect it is at best 
near trivial and often unpredictable, sometimes increasing a particular sort 
of crime rather than reducing it. 
This is not to say that deterrence can never be increased through the 
manipulation of legal rules. Under special circumstances, where all three 
prerequisites are satisfied, one can produce a modest deterrent effect, albeit 
one that can quickly fade. The ultimate conclusion, then, is not to reject 
deterrence as a distributive principle, but rather to understand that it has 
specific requirements and has limited situations in which it can be effective. 
Its strengths and weaknesses might be summarized this way. (I'll provide 
such a summary for each alterative distributive principle to make it easier to 
compare them in a single table at the end.) 
4. See generally Oren Bar-Gill & Alon Harel, Crime Rates and Expected Sanctions: The 
Economics of Deterrence Revisited, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 485 (2001). 
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It REHABILITATION 
There are reasons to be skeptical about rehabilitation as a distributive 
principle for criminal liability and punishment.s First, such programs 
typically work only for lirrrited kinds of offenses and offenders. When they 
do work, the effects tend to be quite modest. Perhaps even more 
problematic, if rehabilitation were the sole distributive principle for liability 
and punishment, the system would release all offenders who could not be 
rehabilitated, which would probably be the majority of those incarcerated 
today. Needless to say, this would likely be seen as unworkable by anyone, 
whether their interest is in crime control or in doing justice. It probably 
explains why no known system has ever used rehabilitation as its sole 
distributive principle. We will consider later whether rehabilitation rrright be 
used as part of a hybrid distributive principle in conjunction with some 
other principal. For example, one might construct a hybrid distributive 
principle that relies upon rehabilitation but if rehabilitation is not possible, 
reverts to incapacitation. 
On the other hand, rehabilitation might be a very good correctional 
policy. That is, one rrright want prison wardens and probation and parole 
officials to use rehabilitation programs as much as possible for those 
offenses and offenders were rehabilitation is, in fact, possible. Used under 
the right circumstances, it could well be a good investment. What is 
problematic is using rehabilitation as the basis for deciding who the 
criminal justice system should restrain and for how long. 
5. For a more detailed discussion, see ROBINSON, supra note t, at ch. 5. 
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One last point is worth mentioning. There may well be special value to 
rehabilitation apart from its crime control potential. Most would agree that 
there is intrinsic value in helping people to change themselves to live more 
useful and satisfying lives to their full potential. 
III. INCAPACITATION OF THE DANGEROUS 
Unlike deterrence and rehabilitation, there is no doubt that incapacitation 
can effectively control future crime. It does work. And I think it equally 
clear that there is general agreement that society has a right to protect itself 
by restraining dangerous persons, as it does now with the civil commitment 
of those who are mentally ill, who have contagious diseases, or who have a 
drug dependency. 6 
The weakness of incapacitation comes from its use as a distributive 
principal for criminal liability and punishment within the criminal justice 
system. The problem is that the system, for good reasons that I'll talk about, 
continues to advertise itself as being in the "criminal justice" business, as if 
it was designed solely to punish people for past offense. Thus, when the 
system is being used for preventive detention purposes, incapacitating 
persons in order to prevent future crimes that we think they may commit, it 
must "cloak" its preventive nature; it must continue to pretend that it is only 
bringing about justice for a past offense. And it is that preventive-detention 
use of the criminal justice system, with its attendant "cloaking," that 
produces serious problems. To telegraph my conclusions: Such a practice 
undermines the system's predictive accuracy, which in tum reduces its 
preventive effectiveness and efficiency. At the same time, it increases the 
criminal justice system's unfairness to detainees and undermines the 
criminal justice system's moral credibility with the community, which in 
tum reduces its normative crime control effectiveness. 
One may wonder: Why bother doing preventive detention within the 
criminal justice system? Why not do it as part of a separate, open, civil, 
preventive detention system? There are good reasons why not: System 
designers do in fact have reasons for being attracted to preventive detention 
cloaked as criminal justice, rather than to open preventive detention. 
The older people in the audience may remember the political upheavals 
of the 1970s that surrounded what were rather modest proposals for open 
preventive detention, such as detention after arrest pending trial. These 
battles produced enormous political pressure. By cloaking preventive 
6. For a more detailed discussion, see id. at ch. 6. 
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detention as criminal justice, system designers can get where they want to 
go without this "heat" on their backs. 
The cloaking also allows the system to avoid the limitations that 
logically follow preventive detention, such as the legal limitations that we 
put on civil commitment. More on this in a moment. 
Finally, cloaking preventive detention as criminal justice also has the 
benefit of reducing the visibility of the criminal justice system's shift away 
from deserved punishment. This is important because greater openness 
about this shift would tend to undermine the criminal justice system's 
"moral credibility" and thereby undermine its normative crime control 
effectiveness. I'll discuss this in more detail when we take up desert as a 
distributive principle. 
While one can understand why such cloaking is attractive to system 
designers, the fact is that such cloaking is also seriously problematic for the 
effectiveness of preventive detention. Let me give two examples. 
Where the goal is incapacitation of dangerous offenders through the 
criminal justice system, it is common to use a person's criminal history, 
rather than a direct quantification of their current harmfulness, as the 
measure of their dangerousness. This is because the former appears to be 
related in some way to the offender's blameworthiness, and thus looks more 
like justice. That is, it makes the criminal justice system look more like it is 
doing criminal justice and less like it is doing preventive detention. 
Unfortunately, criminal history is a significantly less accurate predictor of 
future criminality than would be a direct clinical assessment of a person's 
dangerousness. 
To give another example, when preventive detention is being done 
within the criminal justice system it commonly uses determinate sentences, 
rather than release decisions contemporaneous (or nearly so) with release. 
That is, judges impose a sentence, including the release date, at the time of 
sentencing rather than delaying the decision until the time when release is 
contemplated. For cloaking purposes, this practice makes good sense: all of 
the factors affecting deserved punishment are available at the time of 
sentencing. If preventive detention is to be cloaked as doing justice, there is 
little justification for delaying the release decision. 
The difficulty with this cloaking practice is that making release decisions 
at the time of sentencing significantly reduces their accuracy for preventive 
detention purposes. It is difficult enough to predict future criminality at the 
time of release. It is much more difficult to accurately predict future 
criminality months or years or decades earlier, when the offender is initially 
being sentenced. 
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These kinds of cloaking practices are bad for effective and efficient 
preventive detention because by reducing predictive accuracy, they provide 
less protection at greater cost. Relying upon criminal history as the stand-in 
for dangerousness, for example, means that dangerous persons can be 
released because of insufficient criminal history. Consider the case of 
stalking as a first conviction. If social scientists can reliably predict that the 
stalking will mature into greater violence, good prevention would favor 
detention, but the lack of criminal history would translate into immediate 
release. 
At the same time, relying upon criminal history as the stand-in for 
dangerousness means that non-dangerous persons will be detained simply 
because they have a criminal history or because they were dangerous back 
when they were sentenced. The problem is apparent in the operation of the 
"three strikes" rule. The common trajectory for violent offenders is 
increased violence in the late teens and 20s, the testosterone years, that 
trails off as the offender gets older. Thus, the focus on criminal history 
under "three strikes" means that the young offender runs free during his 
most violent time, as he is building his criminal history, then is imprisoned 
after he has finally reached his third strike-often as his violence is 
naturally tapering off This, unfortunately, tends toward producing a 
collection of geriatric nonviolent detainees. 
Not only is preventive detention cloaked as criminal justice bad for 
effective preventive detention, it is also unfair to detainees. By doing 
preventive detention under the guise of criminal justice, it avoids the 
limitations that logically should constrain it. Specifically, where the 
justification for detention is the prediction of future criminality, the system 
logically ought to have a principle of minimum restraint. That is, the 
preventive detention rationale justifies no more restraint than is necessary to 
protect society, which may mean the use of methods other than 
imprisonment. Preventive detention also logically means nonpunitive 
conditions, as is now the case with civil commitment of the mentally ill. It 
also means a right to treatment, if that treatment can reduce the need for 
further detention. It also means a right to periodic review. That is, the 
government ought to have to regularly show continuing dangerousness if it 
seeks to continue preventative detention. Finally, a preventive detention 
system logically would set some minimum decision standards, requiring, for 
example, some defined minimum likelihood of a violation, some minimum 
defmed level of harm seriousness threatened, and some minimum defined 
level of predictive reliability. 
By using incapacitation as a distributive principle for criminal liability 
and punishment, all of these logical limitations called for by a preventive 
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detention system are avoided. If we are to have preventive detention, and 
there are good arguments for why society ought to be able to protect itself 
with such a system, it would be better for both society and for detainees to 
have that preventive detention done openly through a system of civil 
commitment rather than cloaked as a system of criminal justice. 
I understand the resistance of many: that permitting such an expansion of 
a civil commitment system would be dangerous. This has been discussed as 
what one might call the "Gulag Archipelago" Problem. Liberal 
democracies, and American values in particular, naturally want to put 
significant limits on the power of govemment to intrude in the lives of its 
citizens. Punishing criminals is one thing, but detaining people based only 
on a prediction of future criminality is another. 
However, the important point here is that our current practice of doing 
preventive detention cloaked as criminal justice creates the potential for 
greater abuse, not less. It avoids the scrutiny that an open preventive 
detention system would attract. It avoids the logical constraints to which 
preventive detention should be subject. 
If you have any doubt about this, imagine the Rummel case coming 
before the Supreme Court as a preventive detention case rather than as a 
criminal justice case. Rummel was convicted of a third minor fraud and 
under a three strikes statutes was sentenced to life imprisonment. The 
Supreme Court held the sentence constitutional. There are many good 
reasons not to constitutionally constrain the criminal justice sentencing 
process too tightly; criminal justice does sometimes need life imprisonment 
as a punishment. But if Rummel had come before the Court as a preventive 
detention case, which in reality its three-strikes predicate made it, one can 
imagine that it would not have passed the Court's laugh test. Automatic life 
detention to avoid another minor fraud offense? I don't think so. 
The strengths and weaknesses of rehabilitation and incapacitation might 
be summarized this way: 
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IV. EMPIRICAL AND DEONTOLOGICAL DESERT 
I noted earlier that desert as a distributive principle would give criminal 
liability and punishment according to an offender's blameworthiness, which 
would take account of the extent of the harm or evil of his conduct, his 
culpable state of mind at the time of the offense, an assessment of his 
personal capacities that might shape what we could reasonably have 
expected of him, and a variety of other factors. 
I have distinguished here the traditional deontological desert from what 
has been called "empirical desert." The former is an assessment of moral 
blameworthiness logically derived from principles of right and good, 
typically by moral philosophers. The latter is derived from social science 
studies of a community's shared intuitions of justice. Empirical desert is not 
"true justice" in a transcendent sense but only a representation of the 
principles by which the community actually makes judgments about 
justice.7 
It is obvious why one might care about doing justice in a deontological 
sense. Why might one care about empirical desert? Why might empirical 
7. For a more detailed discussion, see id at eh. 7. 
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desert be an attractive distributive principle for criminal liability and 
punishment? The short answer, we will say, is that it might make sense for 
instrumentalist crime control reasons. We will come back to that 
revolutionary idea-that doing justice, at least in an empirical desert sense, 
might be an effective crime control strategy-because it does put a new 
spin on the traditional view that the retributivist interest in doing justice and 
the instrumentalist interest in controlling crime are inevitably in conflict. 
To work up to this conclusion, let me give some background from the 
social science studies of the past decade or more. 8 Laypersons see 
punishment as something that is properly imposed according to desert, that 
is, blameworthiness. When they are asked to assign punishment, they don't 
look to the factors that determine dangerousness or deterrence, but rather to 
the offender's moral blameworthiness. 
As discussed earlier, the traditional instrumentalist crime-control 
principles of deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation each conflict with 
a desert distribution of punishment. If any of these principles were used for 
distributing criminal liability and punishment, the system would regularly 
do injustice and would often fail to do justice. Conversely, if the system 
adopted a desert distribution, it would not be optimizing deterrence, 
incapacitation of the dangerous, or rehabilitation. 
However, a desert distribution of criminal liability and punishment 
would provide some significant opportunity for deterrence, incapacitation of 
the dangerous, and rehabilitation, albeit not the maximum that is possible. 
That is, deserved punishment can have a deterrent effect, can incapacitate, 
and can provide the opportunity for rehabilitation. The important point here 
is that to increase any of these instrumentalist effects, the distribution of 
criminal liability and punishment must deviate from desert, that is, it must 
do injustice or must fail to do justice 
Do crime-control instrumentalists have any reason to care about whether 
the criminal justice system regularly does injustice or fails to do justice? As 
iustrumentalists, deviating from true justice (deontological desert) may be 
just an unfortunate necessity of fighting crime, one might argue. However, 
social science hints that there may be practical real-world crime-control 
complications that arise from regularly deviating from the community's 
perceptions of justice (that is, from empirical desert). 
Here's how. We are becoming increasingly aware of the enormous 
power of social influence and internalized norms. The behavioral decisions 
that people are constantly making in their daily lives are driven primarily by 
a concern for what others, especially family and friends, will think of them 
8. For a more detailed discussion, see id. at ch. 8. 
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and for what they think of themselves. The criminal law can harness these 
normative forces if it earns a reputation as a moral authority, that is, if 
people come to see it as a system that reliably punishes in ways consistent 
with people's intuitions of justice. 
A criminal justice system that has earned moral credibility within the 
community is in a position to harness the power of stigmatization, for 
example, a highly efficient mechanism for influencing conduct. It lacks the 
high costs of imprisonment, yet can significantly influence people's 
conduct. In contrast, if the criminal law fritters away its moral authority by 
imposing criminal liability and punishment that deviates from empirical 
desert, it increasingly undermines its ability to stigmatize conduct through 
criminalization or punishment. 
A criminal law that has earned a reputation as a moral authority also has 
a greater ability to avoid vigilantism, which is classically sparked when the 
community sees regular failures of justice that it finds intolerable. Similarly, 
a criminal justice system that regularly does injustice andlor fails to do 
justice is one that risks prompting resistance and subversion, and loses its 
ability to gain the acquiescence and cooperation that a criminal justice 
system relies upon, by witnesses, jurors, offenders, and most participants in 
the criminal justice and correctional process. 
The criminal justice system that has earned moral authority also has a 
greater chance of gaining compliance in borderline cases where the actual 
condemnability of the conduct may be unclear. When insider trading first 
became a crime, for example, it may not have been immediately obvious to 
everyone that this conduct was qualitatively different from other forms of 
aggressive entrepreneurship that are tolerated and even encouraged. If the 
criminal justice system has earned a reputation as a reliable guide to what is 
and is not condenmable conduct, it is more likely to gain the deference of 
the community when it announces that insider trading has crossed a line and 
is indeed condenmable. 
Perhaps the most powerful effect of gaining moral credibility is the 
influence that such credibility gives to the system in the larger public 
conversation by which societal norms are shaped. If we want to change 
people's thinking about the condenmability of domestic violence, or drunk 
driving, or downloading music from the Internet without a license, 
criminalization of that conduct or increasing the penalty to signal greater 
seriousness of the conduct can help reinforce the norm against it. In 
contrast, a criminal justice system that has squandered its moral authority 
by regularly deviating from desert is one that is more likely to be ignored 
during the public conversation because its view may be discounted as just 
one more example of how the system gets it wrong. (Understand that any 
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criminal law, even one with moral credibility, may not be able to establish a 
strong societal norm by itself. That is the lesson of Prohibition. A strong, 
and eventually internalized, norm requires concurring views from a variety 
of sources of moral authority, including social institutions as well as circles 
of friends and acquaintances.) 
One may conclude, then, that the crime-control power of the criminal 
law depends in some significant part upon how well it tracks the 
community's shared intuitions of justice. Thus, let me say a few words of 
background about lay intuitions of justice. First, we have learned that 
people's intuitions of justice are quite nuanced and sophisticated. Small 
changes in facts can and do produce large and predictable changes in 
liability judgments. And sophistication does not depend upon people's 
education or intelligence; it seems to be the standard form. 
Even more surprisingly, there appears to be an enormous amount of 
agreement about intuitions of justice across all demographics, at least with 
regard to the core of wrongdoing-physical aggression, taking property 
without consent, and deceit in exchanges. The agreement here is on the 
relative blameworthiness of different kinds of offenses and offenders, not 
on the absolute amount of punishment to be imposed. However, once a 
society commits itself to a punishment continuum endpoint, as every society 
must do (whether it is the death penalty, or life imprisonment, or twenty 
years), the large number of cases of distinguishable blameworthiness must 
be fit on this limited punishment continuum. Thus, each case will end up 
requiring a specific amount of punishment, not because of any magical 
connection between that amount of punishment and that offense but rather 
because that specific amount of punishment is required to put that case in its 
proper ordinal rank among all other cases. (If one changes the punishment 
continuum endpoint--different SOCIetIes do have quite different 
endpoints-then the specific punishment required to put each case its 
proper ordinal rank would also change.) 
One may well ask how well current American criminal law matches the 
community's intuitions of justice. The short answer is: not well. Modem 
crime-control programs, such as three strikes, high drug-offense penalties, 
adult prosecution of juveniles, narrowing the insanity defense, strict liability 
offenses, and the felony-murder rule, all distribute criminal liability and 
punishment in ways that seriously conflict with lay persons' intuitions of 
justice. 
To summarize, then, the strengths and weaknesses of the empirical and 
deontological desert might be presented this way: 
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We have now considered each of the alternative distributive principles, 
and it is time to answer the question with which we started: What should be 
the principle by which we distribute criminal liability and punishment? 
All of the alternative distributive principles are flawed in one way or 
another. Are we compelled to adopt the least flawed of the group? Or, could 
we combine two or more distributive principles in one way or another to 
create a hybrid?9 
The original "purposes" section of the Model Penal Code provided a 
hybrid of sorts: a laundry list of all of the alternatives, without any 
articulation as to how they were related to one another. IO The problem was 
that when they conflicted with one another-which we know happens 
regularly-the Code's provision provided no guidance as to how that 
conflict was to be resolved. Worse, by seeming to provide a means of 
principled decision making, it created a fa�ade that hid the real potential for 
abuse: A decisionmaker could simply reverse-engineer the process and 
announce a "principled" decision, by simply deciding what result he 
wanted, for whatever unarticulated reason, then looking to the laundry list 
of alternative distributive principles to determine which one would give that 
result; he could then announce a decision "based upon" that selected 
distributive principle. 
9. For a more detailed discussion, see id. at chs. 10-1l. 
10. See MODEL PENAL C:ODE § 1.02 (Official Draft 1962); see also ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. 
§ 13-101 (2010). 
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A principled system must look to a distributive principle that defines the 
interrelation among alternatives. In its recent amendment, the American 
Law Institute adopted a revised "purposes" provision that did just this. 
Here's the text of the new provision: 
(2) The general purposes of the provIsIOns governing the 
sentencing and corrections, to be discharged by the many official 
actors within the sentencing and corrections system, are: 
(a) in decisions affecting the sentencing and correction of 
individual offenders: 
(i) to render punishment within a range of severity 
proportionate to the gravity of offenses, the harms done to 
crime victims, and the blameworthiness of offenders; 
(ii) when possible with realistic prospect of success, to 
serve goals of offender rehabilitation, general deterrence, 
incapacitation of dangerous offenders, and restoration of 
crime victims and communities, provided that these goals are 
pursued within the boundaries of sentence severity permitted in 
subsection (a)(i); 
(iii) and to render sentences no more severe than 
necessary to achieve the applicable purposes from subsections 
(a)(i) and (ii); . ... II 
As you see, the A.L.I. has adopted desert as the Model Code's dominant 
distributive principle. One may speculate that it came to this conclusion for 
the kinds of reasons reflected in the analysis of the strengths and 
weaknesses of alternative principles that we have just worked through. 
As hinted at above, this position seems to resolve the traditional 
retributivist-instrumentalist "irresolvable tension"�but only in a sense. It 
suggests that there is good crime-control utility in doing justice, and in that 
sense rests upon an instrumentalist rather than a deontological perspective. 
However, given the practical realities of assessing desert principles, it may 
be that empirical desert offers the best practical approximation of 
deontological desert, and for that reason the position may be highly 
attractive to the retributivist perspective. 12 
One final note is in order. Our focus here has been on how to construct 
the best principle for distributing criminal liability and punishment. 
Obviously, this is an important inquiry�the most important, the most 
fundamental in criminal law theory. However, we must not lose sight of the 
fact that in the larger scheme of things the issue of the proper distribution of 
Il. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02 (2007). 
12. See Paul H. Robinson, The Role of Moral Philosophers in the Competition Between 
Deontological and Empirical Desert, 48 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1 831, 1834-40 (2007). 
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criminal liability and punishment is only one of many important 
mechanisms for controlling crime, and perhaps not even the most 
significant. 
Within the criminal justice system, the selection of policing and 
correctional policies can be of enormous importance. Outside of the 
criminal justice system, investments in education, social institutious, job 
training, mental health, and a host of other projects can have as or more 
important effects on the crime rate. 
The point is this: don't expect too much from the criminal law's 
distributive principle for criminal liability and punishment. It is essential for 
doing justice and can make a significant contribution to crime control, but it 
can do only part of the work. 
Thank you. 
